Does Remorse Count?:ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release Decisions by Hola, Barbora et al.
VU Research Portal
Does Remorse Count?
Hola, Barbora; van Wijk, J.; Costantini, Fransesca; Korhonen, Armi
published in
International Criminal Justice Review
2018
DOI (link to publisher)
10.1177/1057567718766228
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Hola, B., van Wijk, J., Costantini, F., & Korhonen, A. (2018). Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections
on Their Crimes in Early Release Decisions. International Criminal Justice Review, 28(4), 349-371.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1057567718766228
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 13. Dec. 2021
Article
Does Remorse Count? ICTY
Convicts’ Reflections on Their
Crimes in Early Release Decisions
Barbora Hola, Joris van Wijk, Francesca Constantini,
and Armi Korhonnen
Abstract
Based on all publicly available International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) early
release decisions as of May 31, 2017, this explorative article empirically analyzes, systematizes, and
evaluates how ICTY convicts reflected on their past crimes during early release proceedings
and how this affected decision-making of the ICTY President regarding their level of rehabilitation
and early release. For this purpose, we developed an analytical framework distinguishing between
acknowledgement of responsibility and remorse, as two forms of reflection on the past crimes, and
their general and personal dimensions. Our analysis demonstrates that of all 53 individuals early
released at the ICTY, 36% were considered sufficiently rehabilitated and a part of their sentence
pardoned without any information regarding their outlook on the crimes they had been convicted
of. Only 19% of the early released prisoners acknowledged their personal responsibility and
expressed remorse for the crimes they committed. Others denied, only partially accepted
responsibility and/or showed remorse on a general level, which, however, did not bar their early
release. The article argues that this haphazard practice brings into question the ICTY legacy with
respect to its goal of offender rehabilitation and its potential effects on reconciliation in the Former
Yugoslavia.
Keywords
ICTY, early release, remorse, acknowledgement of responsibility, rehabilitation
More than two decades ago, the United Nations Security Council passed the Resolution 827
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the first ad hoc
international criminal court set up since the post–WWII Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The
Tribunal was created to prosecute persons responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide committed at the territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. Volumes of (critical)
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scholarship have been written about the work of the ICTY, its establishment, laws and procedures,
sentencing, victims and witnesses testifying before the court, or its contributions to history writing or
effect on reconciliation in the postconflict societies (cf. D’Ascoli, 2011; Kutnjak Ivković & Hagan,
2011; Morris & Scharf, 1995; Orentlicher, 2008; Stover, 2005; Wilson, 2011). As the Tribunal’s
mandate came to an end in December 2017, the ICTY’s legacies in all these different areas are being
discussed and evaluated. In this article, we aim to contribute to these discussions by turning the focus
on individuals tried by the Tribunal. We discuss a very particular aspect of the ICTY proceedings:
How convicts reflect on their past deeds at the time of their (early) release. We analyze how and to
what extent offenders’ reflections on the past crimes are considered during the President’s decision-
making regarding their early release and how this might affect an evaluation of the ICTY’s legacy
with respect to its goal of offender rehabilitation and its potential effects on reconciliation.
In addition to its core mandate of prosecuting and trying individuals accused of international
crimes, on various occasions, the ICTY has expressed its aspiration not only to rehabilitate
convicted offenders but also to promote reconciliation. In its sentencing judgments, offender
rehabilitation is often mentioned as one of its sentencing goals, and the level of rehabilitation
is one of the criteria for granting early release to individuals convicted by the Tribunal. Despite
the recent statements by the ICTY President Carmel Agius that the Tribunal did not have the
mandate to offer reconciliation and consequently has “not dealt with it at all,”1 the ICTY has
since its inception on multiple occasions referred to its role in reconciliation in the Yugoslav
region (Clark, 2009a; cf. ICTY, 1998; Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, 1998, para. 21). In any
case, the Tribunal has certainly constituted one of the major actors in the transitional justice and
recovery process following the wars in the Former Yugoslavia. Its indictments, proceedings,
verdicts, sentence pronouncements, and the (early) release of those convicted have undoubtedly
affected reconciliation processes and relationships among individuals and communities on the
ground, even if unintentionally, collaterally, and negatively (cf. Clark, 2012; Hayden, 2011;
Meernik & Guerrero, 2014).
Rehabilitation ultimately aims to reintegrate the convict in society and to enable him “to socially
function in a way that is acceptable to both himself/herself and society” ( van Kalmthout & Dur-
nescu, 2008, p. 28). As we already touched upon in our previous work (Hola & van Wijk, 2016;
Kelder, Hola, & van Wijk, 2014), in the context of international crimes and international criminal
courts, this might, however, lead to a rather paradoxical scenario. If a society, to which a convict is
released, still endorses and justifies the past violence, his reintegration prospects “to socially
function in an acceptable way” after being released from a foreign prison might be much better,
if he does not acknowledge having committed any crimes, nor shows any remorse. Also, as Ander-
son (2017, p. 230) argues, narratives of denial may even be psychologically functional as this allows
perpetrators to maintain positive self-identities; it can protect the self from threats, increase self-
esteem, decrease depression, improve physical health, and ease social relationships. Reconciliation
between former adversaries, on the other hand, can arguably only meaningfully start once perpe-
trators accept their role in the commission of crimes, demonstrate remorse, and even sincerely
apologize for their deeds. Denying ones’ crimes or—even worse—justifying the past behavior or
stating that one would act the same in similar circumstances may outrage victim groups, tear open
old wounds, and possibly create instability in an already fragile region. It is difficult to conceive true
reconciliation if perpetrators continue to deny any responsibility, justify the past crimes, and offer no
regret.
The above presents an obvious paradox. For successful reintegration it may, for some offenders,
be best not to acknowledge any crimes or show remorse; for reconciliatory purposes, it is best if they
do. The question remains how offenders and judges at the ICTY have over the past years in actual
practice dealt with issues of acknowledgement and remorse. To what extent, for example, does the
President in early release decisions take into account the counterintuitive thesis that (continued)
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denial of responsibility may be beneficial for offenders and their return back home to their com-
munities? How and to what extent does the President differentiate between acceptance of respon-
sibility on the one hand and remorse on the other?
Based on all publicly available ICTY early release decisions as of May 31, 2017, this article
empirically analyzes, systematizes, and evaluates (i) to what extent and how ICTY (ex)-prisoners
have reflected upon their crimes and (ii) to what extent and how these reflections affected the
decision-making of the ICTY President on their early release. We discuss these findings in light
of the rehabilitative goals of the Tribunal and its (potential) role in reconciliation processes in the
Former Yugoslavia. As a basis for our empirical analysis of early release decisions, the article first
develops an analytical framework. In order to do that, the next section outlines theoretical distinc-
tions between cognitive and emotional forms of offender’s reflection on the crimes (i.e.,
“acknowledgement of responsibility” and “remorse”), and between its general and individual/per-
sonal dimension. Based on existing scholarship, it discusses relevance of acceptance of responsi-
bility and remorse for the assessment of offender rehabilitation and for individual and community
reconciliation processes. Thereafter, methodology, including its limitations is discussed. The article
then presents the results of our explorative analysis of the ICTY early release decisions, which are
situated in broader discussions of the ICTY legacy when it comes to offender rehabilitation and its
effects on reconciliation processes.
Rehabilitation, Reconciliation and Offender’s Reflection on Crime:
Acknowledgement of Responsibility and Remorse
Offenders can look back at the past and reflect on the crimes they have been convicted of in many
different forms and ways. Conceptually, one can differentiate between two forms of reflection:
acceptance of responsibility and remorse. Furthermore, in case of international crimes, both forms
can take on two different levels: general and personal. This section discusses the different forms and
levels of offenders’ reflection on their crimes and how they in theory relate to offender rehabilitation
and (individual and societal) reconciliation.
Acknowledgement of Responsibility
Acknowledgement (acceptance) of responsibility is a cognitive rather than emotional form of
reflection on the past.2 Ware and Mann (2012) define the acceptance of responsibility as “giving a
detailed and precise disclosure of events which avoids external attributions of cause and matches the
official ( . . . ) account of the offence” (p. 281). In its most pure form, it means that the offender
acknowledges that an offense took place, that he is responsible for the offense, and there is an
absence of denial, minimization, justifications, and excuses. Therefore, responsibility would be fully
acknowledged by an offender stating “I did it—all of it, exactly how the official records said I did it”
(Ware & Mann, 2012, p. 281).
Offender rehabilitation is on the most general level defined as a process of change toward
specified objectives (Hola & van Wijk, 2016). Depending on “the model of change” underlying a
particular rehabilitation program and its goals, acceptance of responsibility by an offender can be
seen as an aim of successful rehabilitation or as a precondition for a meaningful participation in a
rehabilitation treatment (Bullock & Condry, 2013; Theriot, 2006). We have argued elsewhere for
including acknowledgement of one’s responsibility as one of the rehabilitation goals in case of
perpetrators of international crimes to promote offender’s moral reform and social rehabilitation
between perpetrators and victims in postconflict societies (Hola & van Wijk, 2016). Also, in case
of domestic/ordinary crimes, a large variety of cognitive behavioral programs aim at engaging
“offenders [ . . . ] as moral actors with the capacity both to re-evaluate the past (anti-social) choices
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and to make superior, pro-social choices in the future” (Robinson & Crow, 2013, p. 121). These
programs take as a point of departure that the offender has done wrong and encourage him to
denunciate past acts, think ethically, and develop victim empathy. Such interventions evolve
around themes of personal responsibility, choice, and recognition of moral implications of those
choices. They typically converge in their attempts to engage offenders in a “moral discourse,”
which not only encourages the acknowledgement of wrongdoing but also seeks to instill in
offenders a new consciousness of their behavior including awareness of its impact on others
(Dignan, 2005). Whether or not acceptance of responsibility should be included as one of the
goals of penitentiary rehabilitation is, however, contested. In their article discussing rehabilitation
of sexual offenders, Ware and Mann (2012), for example, question the relevance and necessity of
acceptance of responsibility as one of the goals of offender rehabilitation. They argue, among
others, that there is a lack of consistent reliable evidence indicating that denial and minimizations
increase recidivism risks. In case of perpetrators of international crimes, there is another consid-
eration, which creates an obvious paradox when it comes to rehabilitation of international pris-
oners and their acknowledgement of responsibility. Rehabilitation as the process of change
ultimately aims to reintegrate the convict in society and to enable him “to socially function in a
way that is acceptable to both himself/herself and society” (van Kalmthout & Durnescu, 2008, p.
28). Generally speaking, acknowledgement of the past wrong behavior and expression of remorse
are beneficial for reintegration in society and can be considered signs of offender’s preparedness
to socially function in an acceptable way. However, this may be different in the context of
international crimes and international criminal courts (Hola & van Wijk, 2016; Kelder et al.,
2014). A convicted war criminal, who upon release by an international tribunal, plans to return
to his country, where a society still endorses ideology and animosities, which fueled the war, may
actually have an interest in denying having committed any crimes. Indeed, in a deeply divided
postconflict setting such as the Former Yugoslavia, it may, from the perspective of convict’s
future reintegration, be beneficial not to acknowledge having committed any crimes, let alone
to show any remorse.
Acknowledgement of responsibility by perpetrators, however, is regarded to be an important
starting point to come to individual, interpersonal but also broader intercommunity reconcilia-
tion. Reconciliation, similar to rehabilitation, is a contested concept with many different def-
initions and meanings. We are not going to discuss different conceptualizations of
reconciliation here. Neither will we discuss the fact that there generally is a lack of empirical
evidence and substantiation for understanding what reconciled societies look like, how recon-
ciliation works, and whether it can actually ever be achieved following atrocities. For the
purposes of this article, reconciliation is understood as a relational concept, which is dynamic
and fluid denoting different degrees of peaceful cohabitation, and of mutual acceptance of
former perpetrators, victims, and their communities. In this respect, acknowledgement of
responsibility by a perpetrator arguably forms a basis for any meaningful interpersonal and
community reconciliation process as it can promote mutual acceptance of victims and perpe-
trators, forgiveness, and help in building mutual tolerance or even trust.3 As Alex Boraine,
former Co-chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, famously testified
during the ICTY sentencing hearing of Biljana Plavsic.
In my experience, accepting responsibility for terrible crimes can have a transformative and traumatic
impact on the perpetrator, but also on the victims and the wider community. Such acceptance, whether by
a guilty plea in a criminal case or in some other forum, can, I believe, be a significant factor in promoting
reconciliation and creating what I would call space for new attitudes and new behavior. It has that
potential. I’m not saying it’s always realized. (Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavsic, 2002, p. 591)
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As will be discussed in the next paragraph, acceptance of responsibility is, however, considered to be
just one and certainly not sufficient precondition of any reconciliation process. When complemented
with (sincere and credible) remorse (and apology), this is generally believed to have an even more
positive impact.4
Remorse
Remorse is a difficult to define and highly contested concept. In the context of this article, we will
use the definition as suggested by Proeve and Tudor (2010, p. 61):
Remorse may be defined as a distressing emotion that arises from acceptance of personal responsibility
for an act of harm against another person. Often, with further reflection, the remorseful individual may
desire that the act had never occurred at all and wish to make restitution toward the victim.
Consequently, whereas acceptance of responsibility is a cognitive response to attributed criminal
behavior, remorse can be defined as the subsequent emotional—typically apologizing or emphatic—
reflection. Similar to acceptance of responsibility, the relevance and necessity of demonstrating
remorse for purposes of rehabilitation is debated. Various empirical studies in national systems have
shown that remorse plays an important role in observers’ judgments of defendants. A person
considered to be remorseful is perceived to be less likely to recidivate and to have a higher potential
for rehabilitation (Kleinke, Wallis, & Stalder, 1992; Proeve & Howells, 2006; Zhong et al., 2014).5
Yet Bagaric and Amarasekara (2001), among others, argue that there is no empirical evidence to
support a correlation between remorse and decreased recidivism. There are various authors who
suggest that demonstration of remorse is beneficial for reconciliation. Holmgren (1993) and Enright
(1996), for example, claim that without acknowledgement, repentance, and accountability, there
cannot be any forgiveness in transitional justice. Referring specifically to gross human rights
violations committed during an authoritarian state violence, Payne (2008) argues that public con-
fessions are important for democracy and that remorseful perpetrators may stir up public debates
about the past in their societies. This could in turn trigger healthy democratic processes of political
participation, freedom of expression, and the contestation of political ideas. Harmon and Gaynor
(2007) argue that remorse expressed during an international criminal trial may be positively received
by victims and consequently lead to an improvement of community and individual relations (cf. also
Bibas & Bierschbach, 2004). However, at the international criminal tribunals, expressions of
remorse by defendants had often been preceded by plea bargains, which resulted in dismissed
charges and reduced sentences. On many occasions, victims were reported to be disappointed with
extremely lenient sentences (cf. Combs, 2003; Stover, 2005). Such feelings of disappointment,
victims’ suspicion of purely strategic motivations on the part of a perpetrator, and not seeing justice
done might counter any possible beneficial effects of “remorseful perpetrators” on any reconcilia-
tion processes (Clark, 2009b).
Indeed, another major challenge, which is intrinsically linked to assessment of any expression of
remorse, is that there are practical difficulties to accurately discern remorse in human expression.
Illustrative in this regard are the statements by a U.S. judge, interviewed by Zhong et al. (2014,
p. 43), who given the complexity of assessing remorse opposed the incorporation of remorse in
judicial decision-making:
[Assessment of remorse] is very difficult, especially for judges who are just seeing bits and slices when
the person appears in these very formalized, stylized settings. For judges to think, sitting up on the bench,
that they can really figure out whether this guy is remorseful, is remorseful enough, and is it real, it is the
height of arrogance.
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Irrespective of these difficulties, judges in many domestic jurisdictions, but also at the international
courts, do accept remorse as a mitigating factor in sentencing or use it in evaluation of offender’s
level of rehabilitation (Bagaric & Amarasekara, 2001; D’Ascoli, 2011).
General Versus Personal Acknowledgement and Remorse
The previous section has demonstrated that acknowledgement of responsibility and remorse can
be seen as two different, though at times interlinked, forms of how an offender can reflect on the
crimes. For the purposes of this study, we would refer to these different types of reflection as,
respectively, “cognitive” and “emotional.” In practice, these two are not necessarily correlated and it
is, for example, perfectly conceivable that an offender acknowledges his responsibility but does not
feel remorseful. In case of conventional crimes, it is however much more difficult to conceive of an
individual who is remorseful, without acknowledging his individual crimes and his responsibility.
However, this might not be as straightforward with respect to international crimes. International
crimes are examples of a large-scale, systematic criminality, often perpetrated within a specific
context of societal upheavals, identity-based conflicts or wars. They are characterized by a multi-
plicity of offenders, a multiplicity of victims, and a multiplicity of crimes, typically committed
during large-scale violent campaigns. Individual criminal acts, for which offenders can be prose-
cuted before a court of law, thus often constitute a tiny fraction of the overall harm caused by a
widespread campaign of violence. Consequently, in case of international crimes, it is conceivable
that an offender may “in general” acknowledge an overall harm or that crimes were committed, but
not acknowledge personally being responsible. He may also in general express regret and feeling
sorry for crimes committed in times of war or suffering of victims but not specifically share his
sentiments regarding the crimes he himself is convicted of. This difference has also been noted by
the panel of judges of the International Criminal Court in their decision on sentence review of
Germain Katanga. When discussing Katanga’s dissociation from crimes, judges referred to the fact
that there is a difference between a person expressing opposition to a particular criminal act in the
abstract and a person accepting responsibility and expressing remorse for having (personally)
committed those criminal acts (Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, 2015, p. 20). In the Lubanga
decision, the panel held that Lubanga had expressed remorse for the general situation of unrest that
existed in his community and that he clearly expressed his general opposition to a crime of con-
scripting, enlisting, and using children to participate actively in hostilities. Yet the panel continued,
Lubanga
did not acknowledge his own culpability for conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen
years old and using them to participate actively in hostilities or express remorse or regret to the victims of
the crimes for which he was convicted.
Because of this, the panel considered that this indicates that Lubanga had not genuinely disso-
ciated from his crimes (Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 2015, pp. 20–21).
Analytical Framework: Reflection on Crimes Continuum
For the purposes of our analysis of ICTY early release decisions, we have developed an analytical
framework distinguishing nine prototypes of prisoners based on different forms and levels of their
reflection on the past crime. As we argued above, a convict’s reflection on his crimes can be (i)
cognitive and/or emotional and (ii) general and/or personal. In practice, arguably, reflections on
crime come in different degrees and shades. It is to be expected that there exists a continuum when it
comes to the convicts’ reflection, whereby some fully accept responsibility and generously express
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remorse for their personal role, others only partially do so, and others not at all. Schematically, this
“reflection on crimes continuum” can be depicted as illustrated in Figure 1.
The vertical line of the continuum depicts the “cognitive axis” and represents the extent to which
the offender accepts responsibility. The horizontal line depicts the “emotional axis” and represents
the extent to which the convict regrets having committed crimes and expresses remorse. Ideally, in
order to rehabilitate the offender and promote reconciliation between offender and victim(s) and
their communities, the offender either during the trial phase or in the early release request (1)
publicly accepts (acknowledges) responsibility for the crimes (s)he is tried and convicted for and
(2) publicly expresses remorse for having committed these crimes, preferably by extending apolo-
gies to the victims of these crimes. This “ideal offender” would be represented by “the I(deal) type”
in the lower right corner in Figure 1. Conversely, an offender who does not acknowledge any crimes
have been committed (by his group), denies responsibility, and does not express remorse is repre-
sented by prototype “A” in the upper left corner of the continuum. Convicts “B,” “D,” “E,” “G,” and
“H” all partially reflect on crimes, and/or their role in the commission of these crimes and/or the
extent to which they feel sorry. Although theoretically possible, one would not expect to identify any
convicts Type “C”: feeling sorry for one’s personal role in crimes one does not accept personal
responsibility for is highly implausible. Similarly, it is highly unlikely to find any category “F”
offenders who acknowledge in general that crimes have been committed, feel sorry for what they
have done, but do not acknowledge personally having committed any crimes.
With regard to the prototypes, it is important to note that reality is always much more complex
than theoretical models, and it might be difficult to identify any of the prototypes in practice or to
“link” every convict clearly to a certain prototype. In addition, convict’s perspectives and/or expres-
sions with regard to his criminal behavior can change during the different stages of the legal process.
It may, for example, be well possible that someone during trial claims to be innocent and—conse-
quently—does not show any remorse, whereas his attitude and emotions may (have) change(d)
during imprisonment. The opposite is also possible, when a defendant instrumentally with ulterior
motives confesses to crimes and is perceived remorseful in order to secure sentencing discounts but
subsequently publicly revokes acknowledgement and remorse. The well-documented “false






















Figure 1. Reflection on crimes continuum.
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subsequent paragraphs, we will discuss where in the spectrum ICTY convicts fit and how the ICTY
President in the early release phase has responded to the convicts’ reflections on their past crimes or
a lack thereof.
Early Release at the ICTY and Offenders’ Reflection on the Past
As of May 31, 2017, the ICTY convicted 82 individuals with a final judgment. Twenty individ-
uals pleaded guilty, and before or during trial acknowledged their responsibility for (some) crimes,
they were indicted for, and (some) expressed remorse. The average sentence handed out at the ICTY
is 15.6 years, and only five individuals were sentenced for life imprisonment. These are all very
well-known basic statistics. What might be lesser known is the fact that the vast majority of those
who were tried and convicted at the ICTY have already served their sentence and been released.
Most were released before serving their full sentence. In May 2017, only 19 individuals were still
serving their sentences dispersed in prisons in European countries, which agreed to enforce ICTY
sentences and accept individual convicts.6 Consequently, 57 individuals (70% of those convicted by
the ICTY) have already been released.7 In 53 cases (93% of those released), their sentence has been
commuted and they were released early.8 Despite the fact that the ICTY prisoners are serving their
sentences spread in prisons around Europe, according to the ICTY Statute and its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, it is the ICTY President who decides on prisoners’ eligibility for early release.9 Four
factors the President is supposed to consider are provided for in Rule 125: the gravity of crimes, the
treatment of similarly situated prisoners, prisoner’s demonstration of rehabilitation, and any sub-
stantial cooperation with Prosecutor. Consequently, the President evaluates the level of prisoner’s
rehabilitation as one of the conditions for early release. We have already discussed elsewhere that a
clear conceptualization of rehabilitation of international prisoners is lacking and that many different
factors, including prisoners’ reflection on crimes, are taken into account by the President in different
decisions without a principled approach (cf. Hola & van Wijk, 2016; Kelder et al., 2014). As the next
section shows, ICTY prisoners have reflected on their crimes in many different shapes and forms,
and it seems that no matter whether a convict acknowledges his responsibility, denies, or feels truly
sorry, as a rule of thumb (with a couple of notable exceptions), the vast majority is early released
after having served two thirds of their sentence.
Method
We have analyzed all publicly available early release decisions issued by the ICTY President as of
May 31, 2017. We have included all cases in which early release has been requested and the decision
was made publicly available at the ICTY Court Record database.10 In total, we analyzed early release
decisions concerning 58 individuals, who have altogether made 72 requests for early release and/or
sentence remission at the ICTY. Fifty three individuals were eventually released,11 in case of four
individuals, their early release request was rejected and they are still serving their sentence,12 one
individual (Mile Mrksic) died after his early release was granted but before the actual release.
In all decisions, we identified passages discussing reflection on the past and created a basic excel
spreadsheet to get an overview across all the cases.13 In addition, we checked (i) sentencing judg-
ments in order to see whether judges during sentencing mention defendant’s reflection on the past in
any way, (ii) defense sentencing submissions, and (iii) convict’s and prison authorities submissions
for early release, if available, to see whether and how the convicts reflected on their responsibility in
their motions and whether and how prison authorities (or prison psychologists, if applicable) raise
this issue. It, however, proved difficult to find defense or prison authorities submissions in the
judicial record database, as these are often confidential. Our findings are thus mainly based on
information provided in sentencing judgments and early release decisions. We have not interviewed
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the convicts, the President nor the prison authorities. This means that our analysis is essentially
based on secondary data—representations and summaries included in the early release decisions. In
this respect, our data are limited to what the President decided to include in his decision. It is possible
that in some cases, despite being raised in submissions, the President did not include discussion on
prisoners’ reflections on the past in the decision. In addition, sometimes confidential information,
which arguably could have been relevant for our analysis, has been redacted from public versions of
the early release decisions, as is sometimes the case with certain parts of submissions of prison
authorities or prison psychologists.
Consequently, we are unable to ascertain the actual cognitive or emotional state of prisoners at
the time of their application for early release nor to assess whether the representations included in the
early release decisions are reflecting the reality. We cannot evaluate sincerity of acknowledgements
of responsibility or of expressions of remorse and cannot exclude the possibility that statements by
convicts may have been strategical in order to manipulate the procedure and secure sentencing
discounts and/or early release. Notwithstanding all these shortcomings, the discussions included
in the early release decisions do provide an insight into how reflection on the past varies among the
prisoners and how the President factors this in during the decision-making regarding early release. It
does allow us to assess whether the information provided by a prisoner, prison authorities, or
discussed by the President in the early release decision indicates anything regarding cognitive or
emotional reflection of the prisoner on the past crimes and how that information is used by the
President for granting or rejecting an early release.
Results
Of the 53 individuals that have been early released by the ICTY before serving their full sentence,
in case of 19 individuals (35%), their reflection on the past and attitude toward their crimes is not
discussed whatsoever in the decision. It is predominantly their good behavior in prison that serves as
an indicator of their sufficient level of rehabilitation and since they all had served two thirds of their
sentence around the time of their early release request, they are released.
In the remaining 34 cases, reflection on the past is mentioned and assessed. Based on the available
information, we categorized all the 34 prisoners according to our analytical framework based on the
form (cognitive and/or emotional) and level (general or personal) of their reflection. The results are
presented in Table 1. In only 10 cases (19% of those early released), we identified “the ideal
prototype I” that is a prisoner acknowledging personal responsibility combined with remorse for
his crimes. In an additional seven cases, prisoners acknowledged personal responsibility and either
expressed regret in a more general way for suffering of victims or harm of war (three cases) or did
not express any emotional reflection (four cases). Nine prisoners recognized in general terms that
crimes were committed during the war but did not accept their own responsibility, minimized, or
justified their actions or blamed others. Interestingly, in case of eight individuals, no acknowl-
edgement (neither on a personal nor on a more general level) is offered at all: Three of these seem
to stay in denial with no feelings of regret whatsoever, while five express feelings of remorse for
suffering of victims of war and harm during the war.
In the following paragraphs, we will present the most fitting ICTY cases according to the nine
prototypes. We will discuss why a prisoner is categorized as prototypical for each category and how
the President evaluated this in his assessment of prisoner’s level of rehabilitation and early release.
As expected, we were not able to identify any cases that would fall under the Types C and F during
our analysis, and therefore we do not discuss these categories. We will start with the ones depicted in
the upper left corner of Figure 1 (Type A), who keep denying. We will proceed along the continuum
toward more “ideal” prototypes, first discussing those depicted in the upper half of the continuum,
who still do not acknowledge the crimes but at least express general regrets for the harm and
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suffering caused by the war (Type B), moving to the lower half to those who seem to, in one way or
another, acknowledge the past crimes on a general level (“crimes were committed”; Types D and E)
or accept their personal responsibility for crimes and either express no regrets (Type G) or express
regret on a general level (Type H). We end with the “ideal type” I, who accept their personal
responsibility and claim to feel remorseful with respect to their crimes and (in-)actions.
Type A: “No Crimes Have Been Committed, I Do Not Feel Sorry”
We have not found any prisoner who would explicitly and openly keep denying any crimes being
committed during the war. There are, however, examples, which are borderline. Johan Tarculovski,
a former member of a security guard unit at the Macedonian Ministry of Interior, was convicted of
planning, ordering, and instigating killing, destruction of property and cruel treatment during an
attack on Ljuboten, a village on the Macedonian and Kosovar borders. He was sentenced to 12 years
imprisonment. In his 2013 application for early release, German authorities submitted a psycholo-
gical report, which notes his “lack of remorse [for] his offences” and refers to his sense that “he was
convicted for others” and that he “was not the actor but the com[m]ander” (Prosecutor v. Johan
Tarculovski, 2013, para. 20). Clearly, Tarculovski seems to be denying any wrongdoing on his part
and does not express any feelings of regret. The fact that he allegedly admits wrongdoing of “others”
would place him somewhere in between of the Types A and D, but the information contained in the
early release decision is relatively scarce. The President concludes that he has
demonstrated rehabilitation [based on his good behavior in prison] to the extent that he would not pose a
societal threat if released, despite the absence of any evidence indicating remorse for his crimes or
acknowledgement of responsibility for his deeds. (Prosecutor v. Johan Tarculovski, 2013, para. 23)
Tarculovski is granted early release. Similarly, during an early release procedure of Vinko Marti-
novic in 2011, the report submitted by Italian prison authorities stated that Martinovic “did not know
the reasons for his imprisonment and ascribed it to the power of the position he held, maintaining
that he was not responsible for the acts” (Prosecutor v. Vinko Martinovic, 2011, para. 21). However,
here, in contrast to Tarculovski, Martinovic disputes the conclusions of prison authorities claiming
that his “positions were not interpreted correctly because the relevant exchange was in Italian” and
in his submission states that “he knows why he was incarcerated, understands the verdict of the
Tribunal and accepts his punishment” (Prosecutor v. Vinko Martinovic, 2011, para. 21). The



























aThe numbers indicate a total number of individuals included in each category. Numbers in brackets are cases out of the total
number included, which are ambiguous, or information is insufficient or conflicting (as with Bala discussed below).
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President considers the assessment of Italian authorities of Martinovic’s acceptance of guilt as a
neutral factor in his assessment of Martinovic’s rehabilitation. Based on his behavior in prison, the
President concludes that he demonstrates “some” rehabilitation, which weighs in favor of his early
release (Prosecutor v. Vinko Martinovic, 2011, para. 22). Similarly, in one of the early release
procedures of Mlado Radic, French authorities submitted a rather worrying depiction of Radic’s
attitude to his crime. He “continues denying the facts for which he was convicted, particularly those
of rape and sexual assault, and regularly makes racist remarks [ . . . ] and has stated his belief that ’the
shelling of Sarajevo was organised by the UN so that the Serbs would be accused’” (Prosecutor v.
Mlado Radic, 2010, para. 18). As opposed to the previous early release application,14 the President
evaluates Radic’s rehabilitation as a neutral factor for the purposes of early release, expressing
concerns over a lack of detail in the submissions of the French authorities. The President explicitly
states, however, that acceptance of responsibility and remorse is not determinative factors of eval-
uating the level of rehabilitation (Prosecutor v. Mlado Radic, 2010, para. 21).15
Consequently, despite the fact that in all of the above cases, there seem to be (at least on balance
of probabilities) serious concerns regarding the attitude of the prisoners toward their crimes, in each
of these cases the President sweeps these concerns under the carpet and does not make any further
inquiries. Prisoners are considered sufficiently rehabilitated or rehabilitation is determined to be a
neutral factor for the purposes of early release. In none of these cases, the President does in any way
elaborate why denial of one’s responsibility is considered inconsequential for the evaluation of
prisoner’s level of rehabilitation.
There have, however, also been exceptional cases where denial of responsibility was one of the
crucial factors in coming to a negative assessment of a prisoner’s level of rehabilitation. In some,
a prisoner was released nonetheless (Prosecutor v. Haradin Bala, 2013, para. 39), in others, the
negative assessment was used to reject an early release before having served two thirds of a
sentence,16 while in at least three instances denial of responsibility blocked early release even
after serving two thirds (Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, 2017; Prosecutor v. Haradin Bala,
2013; Prosecutor v. Mlado Radic, 2013). In one of the most recent, and rather unprecedented,
early release decisions—the decision on Dragoljub Kunarac (Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac,
2017)—the prisoner’s denial seems to have been one of the decisive factors (next to his very
questionable behavior in prison) in a negative assessment of his rehabilitation. His request for
early release was rejected, despite the fact that he had already served two thirds of his sentence.
Although the President at length discusses Kunarac’s attitude to his crimes, large parts of this
discussion are unfortunately redacted and the public version of the early release decision contains
only one readable paragraph. This paragraph alone, however, is already quite telling. According to
an interview conducted at Bochum prison (Germany) in 2015, Kunarac insisted “he did not
commit the crimes of which he was convicted and that ‘he was shocked’ at the allegations of
rape that were made against him ‘since that was not true’” (Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac,
2017, para. 37). He stated “a woman climbed on top of him, overpowered him and had vaginal
intercourse with him. He just lay there and didn’t move [ . . . ]. Actually he was the one who was
raped” (Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, 2017, para. 37). These are pretty shocking statements
considering Kunarac’s convictions for multiple instances of sexual violence and enslavement of
women and young girls during the war. The President considers Kunarac’s denial, together with
the fact that he has been “a demanding prisoner” and “has not used his time in prison in a fully
positive manner” (Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, 2017, para. 54), as evidence to conclude that
Kunarac “has not demonstrated sufficient signs of rehabilitation at this stage” and “that this factor
weighs against his early release” (Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, 2017, para. 55). He proposes
“other rehabilitation measures might benefit Kunarac” and reiterates that this rejection does not
preclude future applications for early release “in particular should Kunarac consider that changed
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circumstances suggest that he has demonstrated sufficient signs of rehabilitation” (Prosecutor v.
Dragoljub Kunarac, 2017, paras. 69–70).
Type B: “No Crimes Have Been Committed, But I Feel Sorry for the Overall Suffering”
Veselin Sljivancanin, a former general in the Yugoslavian army, was convicted of torture as a war
crime based on his ommission as a commander to execute his responsibilities and intervene in
mistreatment of prisoners of war at the Ovcara farm. Immediately after the final verdict, he applied
for early release, which was granted. In his application, he expressed “remorse for the terrible events
which took place not only in Vukovar but all over the territory of the former Yugoslavia” (Prose-
cutor v. Veselin Sljivancanin, 2011, para. 26). In doing so, Sljivancanin notes that he is generally
sorry for what happened during the conflict in his home country but does not acknowledge crimes
nor reflects upon his personal actions, omissions, and resulting harm. The President offers a nuanced
assessment of Sljivancanin’s reflection on the past:
Mr. Sljivancanin expresses sympathy for the victims of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and in
Vukovar in particular, but does not express remorse for his own crimes, as he does not link the fate of the
victims to his own actions. (Prosecutor v. Veselin Sljivancanin, 2011, para. 26)
However, the President does not seem to draw any implications from this. Taking into account his
good behavior in detention the President concludes that Sljivancanin has demonstrated “some
signs of rehabilitation” which favor his early release (Prosecutor v. Veselin Sljivancanin, 2011,
paras. 27, 31).
Type D: “Crimes Were Committed But I Am Not Sorry”
Zdravko Mucic, a former commander of the Celebici camp, comes closest to a perpetrator who
generally acknowledges that crimes were committed but does not reflect on his own criminal acts
and responsibilities. Mucic was held responsible for maintaining inhumane conditions for Bosnian
Serb detainees and for creating an atmosphere of terror, in which detainees lived in a constant state
of anguish and fear of being subjected to physical abuse (Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., 1998). During
trial, he was reprimanded for his behavior and intimidation of witnesses. Judges noted that his
behavior suggested that he “appears to have regarded this trial as a farce and an expensive joke”
(Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., 1998, para. 1251). In 2003, immediately after his second appeal was
decided, Mucic applied for early release. In the early release decision, the President refers to his
interview with Mucic during which he allegedly changed his attitude and “acknowledged that the
conditions at the Celebici prison camp were appalling and expressed his respect for, and his gratitude
to, the Bench and the judicial process” (Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic, 2003, p. 2). In this decision,
Mucic is granted release by the President emphasizing his “good physical and mental condition,
irreproachable behavior in prison, attachment to his family and a possibility to exercise his profes-
sion after release” (Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic, 2003, p. 2). Consequently, according to the
President’s summary, Mucic seems to acknowledge depravity of conditions in the detention camp
he was commanding, however, does not reflect upon his role or his actions and/or omissions nor
accepts his personal responsibility. In this respect, as opposed to the decision in Sljivancanin, the
President does not seem to distinguish between the general and personal level of acknowledgement
and the fact that Mucic did not reflect on his personal role in the appalling conditions of the detention
camp. Similarly to Sljivancanin, however, Mucic was released nonetheless.17
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Type E: “Crimes Were Committed and I Am Sorry for the Overall Suffering”
Mlado Radic, a professional policeman and a former shift leader in the Omarska detention camp,
was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment for his role in the camp and personal mistreatment of
detainees. Among others, he was convicted of rape and sexual violence (Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al.,
2001). During his incarceration, he applied for early release 3 times and his reflection on crimes
underwent very peculiar changes. Radic in essence moved from a fervent denier of his crimes18 to an
individual, who according to his letter to the President cryptically claims to be “aware of his
sentence, the crimes for which he has been convicted and that he finds it difficult to come to terms
with the fact that many people [ . . . ] suffered torture, such as abuse, harassment, mistreatment,
belittling, etc.” (Prosecutor v. Mlado Radic, 2013, para. 25). Radic further writes “he finds it
particularly difficult if [Italics, authors] he contributed to such crimes through his presence, he is
prepared to apologise to each and everyone and to express my sincerest remorse for everything”
(Prosecutor v. Mlado Radic, 2013, para. 25). According to his lawyer, “Radic has shown a sufficient
level of regret for the victims of the war in the former Yugoslavia” (Prosecutor v. Mlado Radic,
2013, para. 24). Careful reading of his statements however suggests that Radic’s “expression of
sufficient regret and acknowledgement of crimes” remain on a very general level (“victims of war,”
“many people suffered torture”) and the formulations used by Radic (“if I contributed to such
crimes”) still verge on a denial. It is surprising, to say the least, that his attitude has undergone
such a profound change from outright denial in 2007 to at least partial, general and rather superficial
acknowledgement and regret in 2010. The President is also not convinced and adopts a relatively
cautious approach to evaluating the submitted information. He notes Radic’s difficulties to adjust to
life in a foreign prison and that the only “little to no evidence” of his rehabilitation is “[Radic’s]
response to the materials provided to him, in which he expresses his regret for the suffering of the
victims” (Prosecutor v. Mlado Radic, 2013, para. 26). The President concludes that the level of
rehabilitation is to be a neutral factor in the assessment of eligibility for early release. He decides that
since “the only factor that weighs in favour of granting the Request is the fact that Radic served two
thirds of his sentence as of 9 August 2011” to grant an early release, but only effective from
December 31, 2012 (Prosecutor v. Mlado Radic, 2013, para. 30). Consequently, Radic’s case is
one of the few at the ICTY19 where prisoner’s request for an early release is denied after serving two
thirds of a sentence. Despite the fact that his level of rehabilitation is assessed to be a neutral factor in
this conclusion, it seems that the questionable evidence regarding his rehabilitation had played a
defining role in this decision.20
Another interesting illustration that fits this category of general acknowledgement and remorse is
the notorious case of Drazen Erdemovic who was the first ICTY defendant who came forward,
surrendered, and pleaded guilty. In a statement during his sentencing hearing, he expressed regret on
a general level:
I feel sorry for all the victims, not only for the ones who were killed then at that farm, I feel sorry for all
the victims in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina regardless of their nationality. I have lost many very
good friends of all nationalities only because of that war, and I am convinced that all of them, all of my
friends, were not in favour of a war. I am convinced of that. But simply they had no other choice. This
war came and there was no way out. The same happened to me. (Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, 1996)
Erdemovic was in the end sentenced to 5 years and shortly thereafter released early. In the early
release decision, the President referred to “recognition of his crimes, their gravity and consequences
and his repeated expression of contrition” (Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, 2008, p. 2). According
to the President, “Erdemovic has thereby demonstrated that he is rehabilitated to the extent possible”
(Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, 2008, p. 2).
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Type G: “I Accept I Have Committed Crimes, But I Am Not Sorry”
The case of Ljubomir Borovcanin comes closest to an offender who accepts his own respon-
sibility for the crimes without offering any regrets. However, in this case, a distinction between a
personal acknowledgement (I have done wrong) and a general acknowledgement (what happened
during the war was wrong) is still somehow blurred. Borovcanin, convicted of crimes against
humanity and war crimes based on his participation in the Srebrenica massacre, applied for early
release in 2016. According to a prison officer, who has been his contact person in prison, he has
“admitted everything he has been charged with, and he has accepted his punishment for it” and
“has no doubt whatsoever that what happened during the war was wrong” (Prosecutor v. Ljubomir
Borovcanin, 2016, para. 22). In his own submission, and this complicates matters slightly, Bor-
ovcanin claims that he “publicly acknowledged that he ‘did not do enough’ and that he recognizes
the gravity of the crimes and his role in them.” Borovcanin asserts that he chose not to appeal his
convictions or the sentence imposed upon him, which further reflects an acceptance of those
findings (Prosecutor v. Ljubomir Borovcanin, 2016, para. 23). In this case, it seems that Borov-
canin indeed acknowledged his crimes and his responsibility for them and on a cognitive level
accepts that what happened during the war (at least on a general level) was wrong. He, however,
does not express any feelings of remorse, being sorry or regret. Nonetheless, referring to Bor-
ovcanin’s exemplary behavior during his imprisonment, this according to the President demon-
strates “consistent and sustained signs of rehabilitation” and Borovcanin is released (Prosecutor v.
Ljubomir Borovcanin, 2016, para. 25).
Type H: “I Accept I Have Committed Crimes and I Am Sorry for the Overall Suffering”
It proved to be relatively difficult to find a defendant who could act as an illustration of prototype
H. Dragoljub Ojdanic would probably come the closest but given the scarcity of the publicly
available information, it is difficult to make any conclusive claims. In his application, for early
release, Ojdanic submits that he recognizes the gravity of the crimes he was convicted of. He
however refers to “his limited role and mens rea” pointing to the fact that in contrast to his co-
accused “he was not convicted as a member of a joint criminal enterprise, nor of the most serious
crimes charged in the indictment, such as murder and persecution” (Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Ojda-
nic, 2013, para. 17).
He asserted that his rehabilitation is demonstrated “through the withdrawal of his appeal and his
expression of regret to the victims” (Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Ojdanic, 2013, para. 17). However, it
is not clear how, when, and in what way Ojdanic expressed his regrets. The President accepts all
these as “positive indicators” of his rehabilitation and grants him early release (Prosecutor v.
Dragoljub Ojdanic, 2013, para. 19).
Type I: “I Accept I Have Committed Crimes and I Am Sorry for the Suffering
I Have Caused”
We classified 10 individuals as falling under the ideal type. Seven of these expressed personal
remorse already during their trial and/or pleaded guilty.21 In this sense, the vast majority seems to
have been repentant already during the trial and their incarceration did not seem to have any impact
on their attitude.22 Therefore, one might argue that at least when it comes to their attitude toward
their acts these defendants were already “sufficiently rehabilitated” during their trial. The conviction
or imprisonment as such seems to have not impacted or changed their perspectives on their role in
the commission of crimes. We use one case to illustrate “the ideal type.” Milan Simic, the former
President of the municipal assembly of Bosanski Samac, pleaded guilty and expressed his regret
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during his trial in very straightforward and clear words, acknowledging his responsibility, not
blaming circumstances or context. He also extended apologies to the victims stating:
I would like to express my sincere regret and remorse for what I have done to my fellow citizens and
friends at the elementary school. I’m aware of the fact that the fact that my best friend was killed and the
fact that I was drunk can in no way serve as a justification for what I have done there. [ . . . ] [A]lthough it
was immediately clear to me that it was impossible to make up for what I have done, my conscience led
me to at least extend my apologies to the people whom I had hurt. I have done that, but in addition to my
sincere regret and remorse and personal apology that I extended to them, I was still haunted by guilt and
it continues so until this day. (Prosecutor v. Milan Simic, 2002)
His acceptance of responsibility and remorse were accepted as mitigating factors in sentencing by
the judges and also mentioned by the President while granting him early release (Prosecutor v.
Milan Simic, 2003). The President did not specifically evaluate Simic’s level of rehabilitation but
concludes that he “is no less appropriate for a grant of early release than that of other prisoners
previously granted early release” (Prosecutor v. Milan Simic, 2003, p. 2).
Fundamental Challenges in Assessing Prisoners’ Level of Rehabilitation
The above paragraphs demonstrate that the ICTY prisoners have reflected on their past crimes in
many different shapes and forms. In some decisions, this reflection is extensively discussed as part
of the evaluation of a prisoner’s level of rehabilitation for the purposes of his early release, in most
decisions shortly, or not at all. In this respect, there are fundamental problems in the current system
of assessing the prisoners’ level of rehabilitation and their reflection on their past deeds at the ICTY.
Whether or not reflection on the past is included in the discussion largely depends on whether it is
raised in any of the documents submitted by prison authorities of an enforcement state or by a
prisoner himself for the President’s considerations.23 If there is no information included in this
respect, the President does not inquire any further and relies solely on, for example, reports con-
cerning good behavior in prison to assess the level of rehabilitation. Only if any of the parties
submits any information regarding prisoner’s attitudes toward his crimes, the President includes it
in his decision-making.
Consequently, in evaluating a prisoner’s attitude toward his crimes and convictions during his
imprisonment, the President relies on statements and evaluations submitted either by prison psy-
chologists24 or by national prison authorities. The President is, therefore, entirely dependent on their
interpretations, which are sometimes very brief, matter-of-factly, one-sentence statements with no
substantiation provided. For example, in case of Drago Josipovic, Spanish prison authorities sub-
mitted that despite difficulties to adjusting to prison environment and not speaking Spanish
his behavior, attitude and demonstration of the acceptance of responsibility stemming from the crimes
committed may be considered sufficient to grant him advancement to a higher grade of treatment and the
serving of the rest of his sentence in his own country. (Prosecutor v. Drago Josipovic, 2006, para. 10).
The President in his considerations of these submissions does not elaborate on Josipovic’s
reflection on the past any further. He is not curious how the Spanish prison officials established
that Josipovic indeed accepted his responsibility despite the language barriers, nor questions the fact
that Josipovic is not going “to advance to a higher grade of treatment” nor “serve the rest of his
sentence in his own country” but will be released and the rest of his sentence will be pardoned
(Prosecutor v. Drago Josipovic, 2006, para. 10).25
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In some cases, however, language barriers, misinterpretation, and misunderstandings are
raised by a prisoner to dispute a negative assessment of his attitude to crimes submitted by
prison authorities. In a number of cases, prison authorities raised concerns about the fact that a
prisoner stays in denial and does not accept his responsibility. Some prisoners contest such
conclusions due to misinterpretation and misunderstandings based on language and cultural
barriers (cf. Prosecutor v. Dragan Zelenovic, 2010; Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic, 2011; Prosecutor
v. Mladen Naletilic, 2013; Prosecutor v. Radomir Kovac, 2013; Prosecutor v. Vinko Martinovic,
2011). It is notable that in such cases the President seems to be reluctant to draw any negative
consequences from these discrepancies or only notes the concerns and considers the prisoner’s
attitude to be a neutral factor in evaluating his level of rehabilitation. Haradin Bala, for example,
applied for early release twice: in 2010 and again in 2011. In the first application, when Bala had
not yet served two thirds of his sentence, the President, upon submissions of the French prison
authorities, extensively discusses his attitude toward his deeds. He quotes conclusions of a prison
psychologist that
Mr. Bala has resorted to denial. He does not assume responsibility for his actions. He denies any
involvement in the deeds for which he was charged. However, he accepts the sentence in an extremely
self-effacing manner. He chalks this up to “politics,” as though it were a manner of sacrificing some few
for the sake of the higher cause of peace? [ . . . ] the risk of recidivism continues to be present. Denial does
not allow him to develop new thought patterns. (Prosecutor v. Haradin Bala, 2010, para. 19).
Bala disputes the conclusions claiming miscommunication and unfamiliarity of the psychologist
with the Kosovo Albanian language and culture, and the crimes he has committed (Prosecutor v.
Haradin Bala, 2010, para. 22). The President resolves this dispute in a very peculiar way. He
questions, in a very vague language, the reliability of the conclusions of the psychological report,
“which appear to be general observations that are not based upon specific information and reactions
obtained from Mr. Bala during his interview with the psychologist” (Prosecutor v. Haradin Bala,
2010, para. 24). The President does not inquire further and does not ask for clarification or additional
psychological assessment. Instead, the President concludes that since Bala had shown good behavior
during imprisonment and willingness to learn French, he has demonstrated some—but very lim-
ited—signs of rehabilitation. At that time, Bala’s application for sentence remission was rejected.
Interestingly, however, it appears that although according to the French Authorities Bala’s attitude
toward his deeds had not changed, Bala was early released in 2012, 1 year after having served two
thirds of his sentence. The President weighing the totality of circumstances grants an early release
while ordering one extra year in prison “to assuage my colleagues’ concerns over Bala’s lack of
rehabilitation” (Prosecutor v. Haradin Bala, 2013, para. 39).
These and similar cases illustrate a fundamental problem inherent in the ICTY system of
enforcement of sentences and assessment of rehabilitation. ICTY prisoners coming from the
Former Yugoslav countries convicted of international crimes are dispersed in prisons across
Europe, integrated in domestic prison populations and their rehabilitation and psychological state
is being evaluated, if at all, in local languages according to local standard operating procedures
(Hola & van Wijk, 2014). In such an enforcement system, it is not surprising that misunderstand-
ings arise. What is more surprising is that such problems are not raised more often. Only in some
decisions, in particular in cases of disagreements or negative assessments by prison authorities,
convicts explicitly addressed these cultural and language-related challenges. In some cases, these
challenges are noted by prison authorities themselves in their submissions on prisoner’s rehabi-
litation. The President, however, seems to have been taking a rather hands-off approach in this
respect.
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Conclusion
In this article, we focused on a very particular aspect of the ICTY functioning: How ICTY convicts
reflect on the past and how their attitude toward the crimes is considered during the President’s
decision-making regarding their early release. In order to do so, we have developed an analytical
framework based on different forms and levels of possible reflection on the past crimes and analyzed
all publicly available early release decisions of the ICTY as of May 31, 2017. We argued that the way
how prisoners reflect on their past crimes and how that is considered in assessing their eligibility for
early release might be relevant in assessing the ICTY’s legacy with respect to its goals of offender
rehabilitation but also to its potential effects on reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia.
Our analysis demonstrates that there has been a large variety of the ways and manners, in which
prisoners reflect on the past, and no systematic, consistent approach in taking prisoner’s attitude
toward their crimes as part of the evaluation of his level of rehabilitation at the ICTY. In 36% of all
the early released individuals, the ICTY President does not in any way assess the convict’s attitude
toward the crimes. Consequently, more than one third of the ICTY convicts are considered rehabili-
tated and early released from prison without any information regarding their outlook on their convic-
tions, crimes, or responsibility. Whether or not reflection on the past is included in an early release
decision and taken into account when assessing a prisoner’s rehabilitation is largely dependent on the
fact whether prison authorities of an enforcement state or a prisoner himself raise it in any of
documents submitted for the President’s consideration. This demonstrates the ad hoc character of
assessments of prisoners’ rehabilitation at the ICTY (cf. Hola & van Wijk, 2016; Kelder et al., 2014).
In 64% of cases (34 individuals) in which a prisoner’s reflection on the past is discussed during an
early release procedure, the ICTY President relies on statements provided by third parties such as
local prison psychologists, prison wardens, or convicts themselves. These submissions are often
conflicting or unsubstantiated. In none of these cases, however, further inquiries, interviews, assess-
ments, or requests for additional information or corroboration appear to have been done. Conse-
quently, the evaluation of prisoners’ reflections on their crimes and its relevance for assessment of
rehabilitation by the President seems to be rather matter-of-factly, superficial, and sweeping. The
analytical framework we developed distinguishes nine prototypes of prisoners based on different
forms and levels of their reflection on past crimes. Of the 34 cases of early release in which a
prisoner’s reflection on the past is discussed, only 10 prisoners (19% of the total number of early
released) fit the ideal type. They appear to have acknowledged personal responsibility and expressed
remorse for the crimes they committed. Others denied, only partially accepted responsibility and/or
showed remorse on a general level. Whether or not, and the way in which, prisoners reflect on their
crimes often proves inconsequential for the assessment of the level of rehabilitation and thus, for
being early released or not. In the vast majority of cases, with only a couple of notable exceptions,
the President seems to automatically grant an early release once “the magical threshold” of two
thirds of a sentence served is reached. In line with what we argued elsewhere (Hola & van Wijk,
2016), we suggest that for the development of a more principled system of early release and
assessment of rehabilitation of perpetrators of international crimes, decision-makers should consis-
tently include evaluations of a prisoner’s attitude toward his crime. In this respect, it is also impor-
tant to acknowledge that there is a difference between cognitive (accepting responsibility,
acknowledgement) and emotional reflection (remorse) and their general and personal dimensions.
Our analysis confirms that the Tribunal has not developed a clear and consistent conceptualiza-
tion of what rehabilitation of perpetrators of international crimes entails and how to assess it. The
ICTY does not require its convicts to reflect on the past (publicly), accept their responsibility, and
acknowledge criminality of their acts to be considered sufficiently rehabilitated. It seems to be
enough that they behave (relatively) well in prison and above all, have served two thirds of their
sentence. Whether or not they deny their past deeds or acknowledge the wrongfulness of their
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actions does not seem to matter. If raised at all, it is discussed in a very superficial and ad hoc way.
The ICTY President does not in any way problematize that the future reintegration of a convict in the
context of the Former Yugoslavia may actually be facilitated by denying the past crimes given the
social realities on the ground. If successful reintegration of convicts in society is one of the reha-
bilitation goals, this consideration should be at least discussed and acknowledged. On the other hand,
we understand that it might be difficult to justify on a normative and institutional level that reha-
bilitated war criminals, given their reintegration prospects, should deny their crimes to smoothen
their return back home. More empirical, theoretical and policy-related research is needed to address
this obvious paradox.
Similarly, if and how the ICTY practice of early release affects reconciliation processes between
victims and perpetrators and their communities in the countries of the Former Yugoslavia remains to
be seen and should be further assessed. Due to the generous early release policies, the actual
sentences convicts serve before their release are in practice even shorter than the ones handed out
on trial. As we briefly touched upon above, victims already feel disappointed by the leniency of the
ICTY sentences. Many convicts are released early without being required to reflect on their past
deeds and their criminal nature. This in turn might lead to further frustrations and disappointment
among victims’ communities and hinder any reconciliation. There have been reported instances of
the ICTY convicts, who were considered sufficiently rehabilitated, early released, and after return-
ing back kept on justifying their past acts. In some cases, these publicly expressed attitudes might be
completely opposite or at least much more nuanced appreciation of their past deeds than the ones
presented by the convicts to the Tribunal. In evaluating the ICTY legacies, other articles included in
this special issue serve as a very important reminder of the limitations of the Tribunal’s legally
constrained reality, which might be very different from social realities on the ground. Much more
empirical research on life after trial of the ICTY defendants is needed to see how these individuals
carry on, shape, or counteract legacies of the Tribunal beyond the courtroom in The Hague.
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Notes
1. Statement made during the 2017 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
Legacy Conference in Sarajevo, where he furthermore suggested that, instead of the ICTY, “all the citizens
in the countries in the region have the responsibility for reconciliation.” See Dzidic D., Hague Tribunal
President, “We Offered Truth, Not Reconciliation,” Balkan Transitional Justice,. Retrieved from June 21,
2017 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hague-tribunal-president-we-offered-truth-not-
reconciliation
2. This is not to say that acceptance of responsibility may not have emotional implications and dimensions.
Presumably, some people can accept responsibility without remorse or any emotional difficulty, while
others may, for example, view the acceptance of responsibility as an emotional act with the potential to
change self-concept and relationships with others.
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3. For interpersonal reconciliation between victims and offenders, compare Hodgins and Liebeskind (2003),
Kremer and Stephens (1983), and Gobodo-Madikizela (2003). For importance of acceptance of responsi-
bility for broader civic and political reconciliation, see de Greiff (2007).
4. It should also be noted that these considerations still remain largely theoretical and indeed a matter of
“belief.” An empirical assessment of these assumptions is still to be offered. Compare Byrne (2006, p. 495).
5. Similarly, Tangney, Stuewig, and Hafez (2011) contend that emotions like shame and guilt may represent a
critical stepping stone in the rehabilitation process.
6. For more general information regarding the post-conviction stage at the ICTY, see Hola and van Wijk
(2014).
7. Six individuals have died after their trial or during incarceration (including Milan Gvero who died after
being granted early release but before his actual release).
8. Sixteen of these pleaded guilty on trial.
9. Art 28 ICTY Statute and Rules 123, 124 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
10. Available at http://icr.icty.org/default.aspx. We have searched the database using key words: “early
release,” “commutation of sentence,” “sentence remmission,” “release,” and “commutation.”
11. From the 53 individuals who were eventually granted early release, 45 individuals were granted their early
release upon their first application, 4 individuals had to apply twice (Haradin Bala, Ivica Rajic, Dario
Kordic, and Zoran Zigic), 2 convicts applied 3 times before their early release was granted (Mlado Radic,
Predrag Banovic), and 2 individuals 4 times (Momcilo Krajisnik, Dragan Zelenovic).
12. Dragoljub Kunarac is still imprisoned despite having served two thirds of his sentence. His early release
request was rejected due to his limited rehabilitation (dealing drugs/clashes with prisoners/denies his
crimes, etc.); Stanislav Galic is also still serving his life imprisonment sentence. Despite being eligible
for early release under German law, the President rejected his early release application and decided that
those convicted to life imprisonment should serve at least 30 years before becoming eligible for early
release. Milomir Stakic is also still imprisoned. His early release application was rejected by the President
as at the time of the decision Stakic had not served two thirds of his sentence and denies his responsibility,
which was taken into account as one of the factors in assessing his rehabilitation and noted with concern by
the President. Finally, Goran Jelisic is still serving his time in Italy. He filed several applications for
sentence remission according to the Italian law, which has been granted and approved by President, but
with no consequences for his future early release application according to the ICTY practice.
13. A codebook that was used to create a spreadsheet is available with the authors. In the early release
decisions, a prisoner’s attitude toward his crimes is usually discussed as part of summaries by the President
of submissions of the parties, that is, prison authorities, in psychological reports, by a convict, or by the
Prosecution; and in the President’s considerations of these submissions.
14. In 2007, the President noted that Radic did not demonstrate enough signs of rehabilitation despite the fact that
his behavior in prison was good as “this is outweighed by his denial of having committed rape and sexual
assault” as detailed by the French authorities in their submissions. Prosecutor v. Mlado Radic (2007).
15. Radic’s early release is rejected, however, due to the fact that Radic had not served two thirds of his
sentence and the gravity of his crimes as factors counting against his early release. See also Prosecutor v.
Milomir Stakic, 2011, paras. 31, 34, 35, where the President explicitly seem to prioritize a good behavior in
prison in the assessment of level of rehabilitation
16. Often together with other factors, such as not serving two thirds of a sentence or gravity of crimes. Compare
also Stakic (2011), Zelenovic (2015), and Prosecutor v. Dragan Zelenovic, Public Redacted Version of the
August 28, 2015 Decision of the President on the Early Release of Dragan Zelenovic (MICT-15-89-ES),
MICT, September 15, 2015, paras. 18 and 20.
17. It should, however, be noted that this is one of the first ICTY early release decisions and that the
substantiation for the decision is very rudimentary.
18. See the decisions of 2007 (Prosecutor v. Mlado Radic, 2007, para. 15) and in 2010 (Prosecutor v. Mlado
Radic, 2010, para. 18) as briefly discussed above in the main text.
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19. The other two are Kunarac and Bala; there are also instances where prisoners served in practice more than
two thirds of their sentence but not due to the fact the President rejected their request for early release. In
case of Banovic, who applied several times, the main reason was incompatibility of the French system of
sentence remissions with the Tribunals regulations. In case of others, it was often the case that their early
release requests were filed only after the two thirds threshold was reached. Compare Jokic D., Ojdanic,
Pandurevic, Plavsic, Simic M., Tadic M., Zaric, or Mucic. In many of these cases, the prisoners in essence
served two thirds of their sentence in the UN detention during a trial due to a lengthy proceedings and
applied for early release only after the verdict was finalized.
20. Unfortunately, due to a heavily redacted character of the 2013 decision, it is impossible to assess to what
extent Radic’s previous denial of crimes or his sudden change of outlook, despite concerns expressed by the
French authorities as discussed earlier, weighed in this assessment.
21. Esad Landzo expressed his regrets during the trial but did not plead guilty.
22. Also interesting to compare to cases, where defendants pleaded guilty during their trials but change their
attitude during incarceration such as Biljana Plavsic or Dragan Zelenovic.
23. Sometimes, in particular in cases of guilty pleas, the President also refers back to prisoner’s acknowl-
edgement of guilt and remorse expressed during the trial in order to evaluate his level of rehabilitation, such
as in the cases of Biljana Plavsic and Damir Dosen.
24. It is not uncommon, however, that psychological evaluations of ICTY prisoners are not made available to
the ICTY or not done at all in national prisons.
25. Josipovic is considered rehabilitated mainly due to his good behavior in prison and early release granted.
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